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Abstract
This paper investigates the level of debt specialization across European firms relying on
a cross-country comparable sample of manufacturing firms. We find that a number of firm
characteristics – such as firm size and age – help predict the firm composition of the various
types of debts (i.e. debt specialization) but not the level of each debt share. In particular, we
observe that small and young firms have a more concentrated debt structure (i.e. they rely
on few types of debt). However, these relationships are not linear and seem to be U-shaped.
We also find that Spanish firms have the most diversified debt structure, and that diversified
firms are less likely to experience a severe reduction in turnover.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally bank loans constitute the main source of debt financing for the majority of Euro-
pean firms. As the recent financial crisis has shown, European firms are thus more vulnerable
when bank lending tightens. A well developed bond market may therefore represent an alter-
native source of funding for the real economy when credit squeezes. If a firm can easily access
external capital markets and/or switch to alternative sources of funding, the risk of being af-
fected by a negative shocks experienced by its bank-loan providers is notably reduced (see Aoki
and Nikolov (2012); De Fiore and Uhlig (2012)).
Indeed, in the recent years, debt capital markets seem to be growing in Europe: issuance of
non-financial corporations has boomed in Europe (see Figure (1)), and surpassed for the first
time in the crisis year 2009 US issuances (see (Kaya et al., 2013)). Despite such an increase in
bond issuances, bonds may remain a fairly exclusive funding instrument (see, for example, De-
nis and Mihov (2003)). Thus, establishing whether this trend is governed by the users of capital
or by the suppliers of capital has important policy implications and it has recently attracted the
attention of several scholars (see, for example, Custódio et al. (2013)).
The majority of these studies, however, consider only a few types of debts (for example,
bank-loans vs bonds, or short-term vs long-term bonds). In reality, firms rely on a variety of
sources of funding. In this regard, the present paper contributes to this policy debate in three
ways. First, we document the pattern of correlations between firm characteristics and debt
structure across seven European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain,
and the United Kingdom). The second contribution of this paper is an analysis at a firm level
of the determinant of debt specialization (i.e. of the use of various types of debt), along with
an attempt to identify which part of it is driven by demand factors. The third contribution
is to provide evidence on the (causal) relationship between firm debt concentration and firm
turnover reduction.
The question of debt specialization is relatively new and only few papers has investigated
it, and – to best of our knowledge – no paper has investigated it for European firms. We can
only mention Rauh and Sufi (2010) and Colla et al. (2013), both of which focus on firms located
in the USA. Rauh and Sufi (2010) show that there are differences in the choice of borrowing
sources between small and large firms, and between firms with high and low credit ratings. In
particular, high-credit quality firms tend to use few tiers of capital, whereas low-quality credit
firms tend to use several tiers of capital. However, they rely on a small samples of non-financial
rated firms. Colla et al. (2013) investigate the determinants of the debt specialization for both
rated and non-rated firms. They find that small (unrated) and opaque firms tend to rely on a
fewer types of debt, while large rated and profitable firms borrow from a multiple sources of
debt. However, they cannot clearly distinguish among possible drivers of debt specialization
as they cannot clearly identify which firms in their sample are financially constrained. In this
paper we make a further step by investigating the determinant of debt specialization identify-
ing clearly financially constrained firms and exploiting the cross-country-sectional variation in
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Figure 1: Bond issuance in Europe
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our sample.
This paper is also related to the growing literature studying the capital structure variation
and the determinant of debt maturity structure, also known as “granularity of corporate debt.”
It is well known that short-term debt have several disadvantages. For firms without access
to other funds to meet debt repayments, short-term debt can for example lead to early firm
liquidation (see Diamond (1991)). However, a recent strand of the literature suggests that firms
manage multiple bond issues with different times maturities to mitigate rollover risk and debt
overhang (Choi et al. (2013); Diamond and He (2014)). For example, Choi et al. (2013) show that
it is less costly for a firm to be exposed to small rollover risks at two points in time rather than
being exposed to a large rollover risk at one point in time. They also document a substantial
variation in debt granularity among firms. That is, a large number of firms have a highly
dispersed maturity structures, while others have a low dispersed maturity structure. They
finally document that firm debt becomes more granular during economic downturns (when
rollover risks are higher). We contribute to this debate by considering various types of debt
with different maturities.
In the following, we first examine the composition of debt structure across European coun-
tries and the correlation between debt specialization and firm characteristics. We find that the
share of short-term bank loans is higher in Spain, Hungary and Italy compared to Germany,
though in Spain firms rely more on long-term securities. In all countries, however, the share
of securities remain fairly low. We also find that a number of firm characteristics – such as
firm size and age – help predict the firm composition of these types of debts (i.e. debt special-
ization). Specifically, we observe that small and young firms have a more concentrated debt
structure (i.e. they rely on few types of debt). These relationships, however, are not linear and
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seem to be U-shaped. We also observe that more opaque firms have a less concentrated struc-
ture. Among these group of European countries, Spanish and German firms have the most
diversified debt structure.
We then investigate the determinant of each debt share. Interestingly we find that, apart
from each country characteristics, only a few (but distinct group) of firm characteristics help
explain the level of each debt share. In particular, being listed on the stock-market now seems
to explain the share of short and long-term bank debt, whereas doing R&D (i.e. our proxy for
more opaque firms) does not affect any type of debt share. Always controlling for financial
constrained firms, we also find again that firms in Italy, Spain and Hungary rely on a greater
share of short-term bank loans. We conclude that firm age and size seem to significantly affect
the way firms combine the different types of debt but not the level of each debt share, while
being listed in the stock market seems to only affect the level of the share of bank debt (both
short-term and long-term). Spanish and German firms have the most diversified debt structure.
Further, we investigate whether the different level of debt concentration of European firms
is a result of supply or demand-side factors. To do that, we compare in each country financially
constrained firms with non-financially constrained firms (to control for the supply effect of
bank loans) versus the same difference for firms located in Germany (to control for the demand
effect in the securities market). We find that firms located in Spain chose to rely on the most
diversified debt structure, though the effect is not economically sizeable.
Finally, we study the relationship between firm debt concentration and turnover reduction.
Relying on IV-setting, we find that firms with a more diversified debt structure are less likely
to experience a severe reduction in turnover.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the dataset used
in the current study and analyze the debt structure in each European countries. Section 3 relies
on multivariate regressions to relate firm characteristics to debt specialization of firm, while
Section 5 investigates the demand and supply-side factors of debt specialization on firms. Sec-
tion 6 studies the relationship between firm debt concentration and turnover reduction. Finally,
Section 6 summarizes and concludes our argument.
2 Data description.
In this paper, we rely on the recently released EFIGE dataset collected within the project “Euro-
pean Firms In a Global Economy: internal policies for external competitiveness”.1 The dataset
covers a representative and cross-country comparable sample of manufacturing firms across
seven European countries: Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain, the UK. The data
are fully comparable across countries, since it is derived from responses to the same question-
naire. The sampling design follows a stratification by industry, region and firm size structure.
To allow adequate statistical inference appropriate sample weights will then be used in the
1See www.efige.org and Altomonte and Aquilante (2012).
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following analysis.
The EFIGE survey includes a wide range of questions which allow us to build both quali-
tative and quantitative variables on firms’ characteristics and activities (e.g. proprietary struc-
ture of the firm; R&D investment, internationalization). Some of these questions refer to 2008,
whereas others ask for information related to 2009 compared to years 2008/2007 (see Table (1)
and (3)) for a full description of the firm characteristics we will use). This dataset provides more
than just balance-sheet information and enables us to address important issues related to the
firm financing. Specifically, in relation to firm debt structure, the dataset allows us to collect
the share of bank-loans and securities – both short-term and long-term – along with the share
of other financial instruments (see Table (2)). In particular, the dataset also allow us to have in-
formation on financial constrained firms, as firms are directly asked whether they applied for a
bank loan, and if so, if their demand was successful or rejected. We can also clearly distinguish
between listed and non-listed firms (see again Table (3)). These variables are important since
they allow us to clearly distinguish between different hypotheses for debt specialization.
The EFIGE dataset shows some interesting phenomena concerning the sources of funding of
European firms. Some of them are well known phenomena. Specifically, if we analyze firm debt
structure, we can see that in bank-based countries (Italy, Spain and Austria) the share of bank
debt is quite high, whereas in market-based countries (United Kingdom and France) the share
of debt securities is much larger (see the value of these shares in panel 1 and 2 of Figure (2)).
However, we can also observe that the share of short-term bank loans and securities is higher
in Spain, Hungary and Italy compared to Germany, whereas the share of long-term bank loans
is lower. In Spain, however, firms can rely on a larger share of long-term securities. In addition,
in all these countries, the shares of debt securities remain fairly low (see panel 2 of Figure ((2)).
Moreover, if we consider all types of debts together according to their maturities (see panel 3 of
Figure (2)), we can see that in Hungary and Italy there is a higher share of short-term debt.
The EFIGE dataset also highlights other interesting phenomena. In particular, we can ob-
serve that German firms have a more diversified debt structure compared to other European
firms. However, to see this latter phenomena, we need to summarize the information about
the debt structure of each firm at the end of year into a synthetic indicator (for a similar study
in the US see Colla et al. (2013)). That is, we need to combine into a single indicator the in-
formation on the relative amount of bank debt vs corporate securities - both short-term and
long-term (see again Figure (2)). This will be the scope of the next section, where we chose to
rely on the traditional Herfindhal-Hirschmann Index (in the following HHI) as our measure of
debt-concentration.
3 Determinants of firms debt concentration.
The HHI index of debt structure can be calculated as the (squared) sum of the each debt share
of the firm normalized according to the number of types of debt. That is,
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Figure 2: Debt structure of European firms (2008)
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Note: Each graph represents the (weighted) average for each country of each type of firm debt share. For each
firm the sum over all types of debt equal 100.
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Figure 3: Concentration of Debt Structure (HHI)
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The index assumes the maximum value of one when there is only one source of funding, and
thus the maximum degree of debt specialization. The index assumes instead the value of zero
when the firm equally divides the debt across all sources of funding. Relying on EFIGE-data
we computed this index for each firms in the sample and averaged it across countries (using the
appropriate weights to account for the probability of each firm of being sampled). As Figure (3)
shows, the value of the HHI is quite high in all European countries, with the median level being
to the maximum in some of them, suggesting that European firms do not tend to diversify their
debt. Firms located in Germany and Spain seem to have the most diversified structure among
these group of countries.
In Table (4) we study at a firm level the determinants of debt concentration (i.e. the HHI in-
dex will be our dependent variable) relying on a fractional logit regression (Papke and Wooldridge
(1996)). Reported coefficients are marginal effects. This model can handle a variable which is
confined in the interval [0,1] and with a significant number of observations at either zero or
one. Though it would not be possible to make any casual claim as we rely on a cross-sectional
regression, we can still derive important correlations which can also give insights on the differ-
ent drivers in European countries. To account for any variable that might affect at sector level
the structure of firms debt, we always include sectoral dummies.
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In column (a) we start with a dummy for each age class of the firms. The base category
are firms older than 20 years old. We can observe that firms aged between 6-20 years old have
a higher concentrated debt structure (+3.5%), while young firms (less than 6 years old) seem
also to have a slightly higher concentrated structure (+1%), though the coefficient is not sta-
tistically significant. There seems to be thus a U-inverse relationship between firm age and
debt concentration. We then examine the structure of debt concentration across firms of dif-
ferent size. In column (b) we thus add a dummy for each size class (in terms of number of
employees). The base category are small firms (with 10-19 employees). As the coefficient on
each category is negative, the grower the firms, the lower will be the concentration index. As
it has been highlighted several times in the literature (Berger and F Udell (1998)), small firms
cannot rely on several sources of funding as for them the (fixed) costs to access to capital mar-
kets are higher. This relationship, however, is not linear, and there seems to be a U-relationship
between firm size and debt concentration: medium size firms (20-49 employees) have a debt
concentration 4% less concentrated, large firms (50-249 employees) 8% less concentrated, and
very large firms (over 250 employees) 4% less concentrate. This latter result is consistent with
a theoretical model in which banks offer more flexibility than market lenders when the firm is
in distress but – outside of financial distress – bank lending have higher intermediation costs
than markets (see Crouzet (2014), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)): when the cost of lending of
banks relative to those of markets increases substantially, medium-sized firms switch to a more
market-financed debt structure (i.e. a higher concentration debt index).
In column (c) we add a dummy for firms belonging to a group (Group) and that have been
involved in mergers and acquisition deals (M&As). Only being part of a group seems to posi-
tively and significantly affect firm debt structure (+3%).
In column (d) we add a dummy equal to one for firms that declared to have been financial
constrained (Financial constraints) and experienced an increase in the cost of bank lending (In-
crease finance cost) in 2009. As one would expect, these variables have a negative effect, which
is statically and economically significant (about 5% less concentrated), on debt concentration.
Firms that were not (fully or partially) granted bank loans, either successfully looked for alter-
native sources of funding or did not reach the desired amount of credit, resulting in a lower
value of the HHI index. To investigate whether information asymmetries are responsible for
different debt concentration, we then add a dummy equal to one for firms involved in R&D
activities (R&D) - as a proxies for firm opaqueness, and a dummy for firm operating outside
the domestic market (Export). Even in this case, these variables have a negative impact on debt
concentration. This result is robust if we replace the R&D dummy with its percentage of firm-
turnover, and contrasts with Colla et al. (2013).2 In column (e), we add a dummy for listed
firms. Though as expected the coefficient is negative (i.e. listed firms are expected to rely on
more source of funding by having easier access to bond markets), it is not statically significant.
2To control if R&D is capturing firm growth opportunities, we also added the share of reduction in turnover
variation between 2008-2009. The results did not change.
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Finally, in column (f) we add a dummy for each country in our dataset to account for all the
(unobservable) macroeconomic conditions which may affect debt concentration in year 2009
(such as short-term rate, inflation or default spread, see (Erel et al. (2012))). The base category
are firms located in Germany. In all countries but Spain, firms have a higher concentration debt
index compared to firms located in Germany. For example, Hungarian firms have a debt struc-
ture that is about 13% more concentrated than German firms. This analysis of the Efige-data
seems thus to suggest that German and Spanish firms have the most diversified debt structure
in Europe.
In Table (6) we now study the determinants of each debt component (i.e. a single regression
for each share of debt) relying on the same firm characteristics used to study firm debt concen-
tration. Interestingly, though firm-size seems to explain the share short-term bank loans and
long term securities, the U-relationship has disappeared. Moreover, also the U-inverse relation-
ship with firm age has disappeared. Strikingly, the coefficient on the dummy for listed firms
now significantly affects the share of short-term and long-term term bank debt (consequently
also driving the behaviour of short-term and long-term debt in general), whereas the coefficient
of the R&D dummy is not anymore significant. Being part of group, now seems to affect the
share of bank loans, while M&As deals decrease the share of short-term bank loans and increase
the share of long-term bank loans.
The country dummies are still significant indicating that – in line with what we observed in
figure (2) – in Spain, Italy and Hungary the share of short-term bank loan is significant larger
(5%, 9% and 13%) than in Germany (the base category), though in Spain the share of securities
(both short and long-term) is larger (about 1.5%). This result is important as we are including a
dummy for financially constrained firms, which positively affects the share of short-term bank
loans and negatively the share of long-term bank loans.
To summarize, these results combined with those on debt concentration suggest that firm
size and age affect the composition of firm debt structure but not the single share of debt, which
is mainly driven by country characteristics. In particular, small and large firms have a more con-
centrated debt structure. Somehow counterintuively – being listed in the stock market seems
also to affect the share of bank loans. These results hold controlling for a number of other firm
characteristics and unobservable sector characteristics. Germans and Spanish firms have the
most diversified structure, though Spanish firms seem to rely more on rhos-term type of debt.
3.1 Robustness checks: model specification
In the previous section we have analyzed the determinants of firm debt concentration by con-
structing an HHI index and relying on a fractional logit regression. To check whether the model
estimated is correctly specified we first rely on a linktest, which basically test whether the “link”
function is specified correctly. We thus regress the dependent variable on the predicted values
and their squares. If the model is specified correctly, the squares of the predicted values should
not be statistically significant. The results from this test suggest that the model is correctly
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specified as the squared of predict values never turned out to be significant.
We then check whether there are problems of firm selection into debt. In fact, the HHI index
can computed only for those firms who hold a positive amount of debt. As such, the drawback
is that we are studying the selected group of firms in our sample who hold a positive amount
of debt. If firms made this decision randomly, we could ignore that not all HHI indexes are
observed. Such an assumption of random selection, however, is unlikely to be true. We try to
account for this, by estimating an Heckman selection model, which allow to control for firms
selection into debt.3 Results are reported in Table (5). Identification relies on functional form as
we do not have any exclusionary restriction to rely on. First of all, it is important to notice that
almost all the previous results are robust (compare the second stage of Table (5) with column
f of Table (3)). The only exception is the coefficient on the R&D dummy which is now not
statistically significant. As such, we can be confident that our previous results are robust to
firm selection into debt. Secondly, it is important to notice that firm size has a positive (and
thus opposite) effect on firm decision to hold debts (see the first stage of Table (5)). This result is
consistent with previous studies (see, for example, Faulkender and Petersen (2006); JS Ramalho
and da Silva (2009)), which suggest that the presence of (fixed) transaction costs in the issuance
of debt may induce smaller firms to rely less on external finance but – conditional on having
debt – they tend to have more debt (in our case, they are less diversified). Finally, the test for
independence between the two equations (see the test for ρ = 0 at the bottom of Table (5))
suggests that there is no correlation.
Motivated by these results, and by the fact that we cannot rely on any exclusionary restric-
tion, we then estimate a two-part model for each firm debt share to check the model specifica-
tion for these shares (i.e. a Heckman model with ρ = 0). More precisely, we rely on a binary
choice model to explain the probability of a firm raising debt along with a fractional regression
model to explain the relative amount of debt. Similar to the Heckman model, this specification
allow us to consider that factors that determine whether a firm issues a debt or not could be
different from those that determine how much debt is issued.4 Results are reported in Table (7).
Even in this case, results are consistent with those achieved in Table (6), which only considered
the subsample of firms which have a positive amount of debt. In particular, again firm-size
seems only to explain the share short-term bank loans, while the U-inverse relationship with
firm age has disappeared. In addition, in line with the first-stage of the Heckman selection
model, firm size has an opposite effect on firm decision to hold (bank) debt. The coefficient on
the dummy for listed firms is again statistically significant for the share of short-term (positive)
and long-term (negative) term bank debt, whereas the coefficient of the R&D dummy is almost
never significant.
To summarize, the robustness analyses we have just conducted suggest that the results of
Section 3 are robust to model specification and firm selection into debt.
3Another different (though related question) would be then to examine those firms who do not have any posi-
tive amount of debt (i.e. zero-leverage firms, see Strebulaev and Yang (2013)).
4Even in this case, however, we also run Heckman selection models obtaining similar results.
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3.2 Robustness checks: additional drivers
The use of country fixed-effects in our fractional logit specification cannot explain the entire dif-
ferences over country groups. It is thus insightful to examine other country-specific factors that
might affect our results. First of all, some countries are usually characterized by relationship
lending, i.e. banks have acquired over time an informational privilege on firms, which should
make bank loans for some firms more attractive than bond markets. To account for that, we
include in column (f) of Table (4) variables measuring (at a firm level) the share and the length
of the relationship with the main bank (i.e. well known proxies for relationship lending, see
for example (Elsas (2005))). Results not reported (but available upon request) indicate that our
previous results did not change, though the length of the relationship turned out to be positive
and significant (i.e. stronger bank-firm ties are associated with a less diversified debt structure).
However, the economic effect of these variable is very low, being below 0.2%.
Another important difference across countries, which may affect the level of firm debt con-
centration, is the level of ownership concentration and the market for corporate control (see,
for example, Rajan and Zingales (1995)). Since we have already controlled for M&As in Table
(3), we now additionally consider the share of the main shareholder as well as his type (i.e.
family owned, public entity, holding firm). Neither of these variables, however, is significant or
significantly affect our results (results are not reported).
We additional consider a measure industry’s dependence on external finance. In the ques-
tionnaire, firms are directly asked the extent to which the industry they work in relies on exter-
nal sources of finance. Even this measure does not affect our results. We finally control whether
our firms has issued equity to face their financing needs in the period considered. Our results
are robust to this final control.
4 Demand vs Supply-side effects.
From the above analysis is still hard to identify the causes of different debt concentration level
of firms. One reason could be that due to higher capital requirements, which forced banks
to deleverage, firms were consequently forced to look for alternative sources of funding due
to a reduced availability of bank loans. Another reason could be that investors’ demand for
corporate bonds has increased as a result of low-government bond yields. It could also be that
after the crisis firms themselves realized that it would be too risky to rely on a single source of
funding and started to diversify their debt-structure (even though bank loans were available).
With the data hand we cannot directly identify which is the role of each driver. We can simply
control for that – as we did in Table (4) - by means of country-level dummies, which account
for these unobservable factors in each country. However, by contrasting margins of financially
constrained firms (i.e. firms that asked bank credit but were not successful) with those of non-
financially constrained firms (i.e. firms that either did not ask for more credit or successfully
got more credit) across European countries with respect to Germany, we can still get insights
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on the drivers of debt concentration at firm level. In fact, the variable “Financial constraints” is
an indicator of the availability of bank loans at firm level (i.e. an indication for the supply of
bank loans), whereas Germany is the strongest economy in Europe with the lowest government
bond yields (i.e. an indication for the highest demand for corporate bonds). What is left should
be the role of the firm demand for various types of debts.
The results from this exercise are reported in Tab (8). From this table is interesting to notice
that the difference in margins is negative and marginally (both economically and statistically)
significant when we compare firms located in Spain with those located in Germany. That is, the
difference in the concentration debt index between financially and non-financially constrained
firms is smaller in Spain than in Germany. That means that financially constrained firms in
Spain rely on broader sources of funding than financially constrained firms located in Germany,
both in comparison with their respective non-financially constrained firms. In all the other
countries, this difference is instead positive, meaning that financially constrained firms have a
more concentrated debt structure. The overall impact, however, is marginal.
In line with the evidence reported above (see again figure 1), these results point to a different
behaviour of Spanish firms and a possible substitution of banks loans by corporate bonds in this
country. These results are also consistent with the evidence provided by Giovannini et al. (2015),
which report different time pattern for the demand for loans by European firms. In particular,
they show that in Spain banks tightened their credit standards at exactly the same time as firms’
demand for loans dropped, while in Italy and France the tightening of credit standards led the
drop in demands for loans by two quarters.
5 Debt structure and performance.
To get insights on the relationship between firm performance and firm debt concentration, we
run in Table (9) an ordinal logit regression in which the dependent variable is a categorical vari-
able which account for the reduction in firm turnover in 2009 in comparison with 2008. More
precisely, the variable is equal to zero if the firm experienced no reduction, to one if experi-
enced a reduction of 10%, to two if experienced a reduction between 10% and 30%, and to three
if the reduction was above 30%. Reported coefficients the average of marginal effects for each
category of turnover reduction. It is interesting to see that the indicator of debt concentration
(i.e. the HHI index) is positively and significantly associated with turnover reduction. That
is, firms relying on a less diversified debt structure also end up to get a strong reduction in
the turnover. For example, firms with higher level of HHI are 3% less likely to experience no
reduction in turnover, while they are 3% more likely to experience a severe reduction (above
30%). This more evident if we report on a graph the predicted probabilities for each class of
turnover reduction in relationship with different level of the HHI (see Figure (4)): as this figure
highlights the higher the level of HHI, the lower are the predicted probabilities of experiencing
no reduction in turnover (see the blu-line with circles). From Table (9) we can also observe that
11
Figure 4: Firm reduction in turnover and debt concentration
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financially constrained firms are also more likely to experience important reduction in turnover
(+8%).
Given the cross-sectional nature of our data, however, the actual causality direction is hard
to disentangle. In the following, we thus aim to conduct a casual analysis exploiting the entire
sample of firms and the cross-country variation in financial integration. We proceed in three
steps. First of all, we utilize the values of the dummies for each country and sector in Table
(4) to construct an index of country debt specialization which varies across countries and sec-
tor (a procedure similar to the one used by Guiso et al. (2004) to develop an index of financial
development). According to this index (see Table (10)), we observe the lowest level of debt con-
centration in Spain and in Germany. In the second step, we use this indicator of country debt
specialization as an explanatory variable in the regressions for firm turnover but this time ex-
ploiting the entire sample of firms (i.e. including also those firms without any positive amount
of debt). The exogeneity of this indicator can be assumed here since the group of firms who hold
debt do not coincide completely with the group of firms that have been used to construct the
measure for each country level of debt specialization. However, in this setting (and especially in
the third step) the use of country dummies is problematic. We therefore remove countries dum-
mies but control for other country-level macro-economic characteristics by including country
gdp per capita in 2007. Results suggest (see column a, b, c, d in Table (11)) that firms in country
with higher level of debt specialization are less likely to experience no reduction in turnover (-
56%), and more likely to experience important reduction in firms turnover (+26% for reduction
between 10-30%, and +41% for reduction above 30% ). Finally, to check the robustness of our
indicator of country debt-specialization, we develop an instrument for the indicator of coun-
12
try debt-specialization. Specifically, we construct an exogenous indicator of country financial
integration in the spirit of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010, 2013). Differently from them, however,
we rely on the most important financial directives only (that is, the prospectus, market-abuse, and
take-over bids directives see Enriques and Gatti (2008)),5 and we also need to synthesize the in-
formation on financial integration into a single cross-country indicator (whereas they have a
time-varying instrument). We thus compute the country indicator of financial integration as
the total number of quarters up to (the last quarters of the) year 2007 that each country has had
in place each directive. For example, for Germany that has implemented the prospectus directive
in the third quarter of year 2005, the take-over bids directive in the third quarter of year 2006,
and the market-abuse directive in the last quarter of 2004, the instrument assumes the value
of 26=9+5+12. The assumption is that the higher the total number of quarters, the higher the
financial integration in the country, and consequently, the higher are the opportunities for firms
to diversify their sources of funding. As this index varies at country-level, we need again to re-
move country-dummies and include an indicator for country macro-economic conditions (i.e.
gpd per capita in 2007). Indeed the first-stage regressions (not reported) suggest that a country
level of financial integration is significantly and negatively associated with a country level of
debt specialization. That is, the higher the country-financial integration, the lower the coun-
try debt specialization. Results for the second-stage are reported in Table (11) in IV-columns.
These results are mainly consistent with those emerged in the second step: firms in countries
with high level of debt specialization are less likely to experience no reduction in firms turnover
(-47%), and are more likely to experience important reduction (+40% for reduction between 10-
30%).
6 Discussion and Conclusions.
During the financial crisis of 2007-09, European banks were concerned about their counterpart
exposure to the US sub-prime market and began to hoard liquidity. In order to repair their
balance sheets and leverage, they thus started to progressively tightening credit conditions. As
a consequence, in such period of reduced bank credit availability, European firms also started
shifting the composition of their debt from bank loans towards debt securities. The way in
which bank loans has been replaced with other sources of funding has differed across countries
and was related to factors that vary across Member States, such as the role of small firms in
the economy, their access to market financing, the importance of the linkages between banks
and firms. Everywhere, however, the development of a financial system that is less resilient on
banks and offers a broader range of financing alternatives is seen as desirable.
To shed some lights on the determinants of firm debt structure and on the level of debt
specialization, in this paper we take advantage of a cross-country comparable sample of manu-
5We do not consider the transparency directive as there is no variation in the implementation time across coun-
tries.
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facturing European firms. Our results suggest that firm age and size seem to significantly affect
the way each firm combines the different types of debt but not the level of each debt share,
while being listed in the stock market seems to only affect the level of the share of bank debt
(both short-term and long-term). We also observe that firms located in Spain chose to rely on
the most diversified debt structure, though the effect which is driven by firm’s choice is not
economically sizeable. Spanish firms also tends to rely more on short-term type of (bank) debt.
These results thus suggest there is a process of disintermediation in Spain, as Spanish firms had
historically relied on bank lending more than their peers in other countries.
Finally, the evidence provided in this paper suggests that it is less likely to observe a se-
vere reduction in firm turnover if firms have a diversified debt structure. This latter result has
important policy implications. For example, in the light of the above results it would be benefi-
cial in bank-based countries to encourage firms to rely more on markets as a source of funding
to achieve a more diversified structure (and viceversa for market-based countries). As such,
a policy that has the potential to bridge the gap between the funding needs of firms and the
availability of bank loans (e.g. by promoting market for debt securities with a tax exemption
for issuers) may work properly.
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Table 1: VARIABLE DESCRIPTION
Variable Description
HHI This variable represents the Herfindhal Hirschmann index of the firm debt in
2009. It is computed as the (squared) sum of the each firm debt share and it is
normalised for the number of types of debt. It varies between zero and one.
Turnover reduction This is a categorical variable which is equal to 0 if the firm experienced no
reduction in turnover, equal to 1 if the firm experienced a reduction below 10%,
equal to 2 if experienced a reduction between 10% and 30%, equal to 3 if the firm
experienced a reduction in turnover above 30%.
Small firm (10-19 Employees) This is a dummy variable equal to one if the number of employees is between
10-19.
Medium firm (20-49 Employees) This is a dummy variable equal to one if the number of employees is between
20-49.
Large firm (50-249 Employees) This is a dummy variable equal to one if the number of employees is between
50-249.
Large firm (over 250 Employees) This is a dummy variable equal to one if the number of employees is above 250.
Young firm (< 6 years) This is a dummy variable equal to one if the age of the firm is below 6 years old.
Firm 6-20 years This is a dummy variable equal to one if the age of the firm is between 6 years
old and 20 years old.
Old firms This is a dummy variable equal to one if the age of the firm is above 20 years old.
Group This is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm belongs to a group.
M&As This is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has acquired or incorporated
other firms in the last three years (2007-2009).
Financial constraints This is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has applied for a bank loan in
2009 but the request was not successful.
Increase finance cost This is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has experienced in 2009 an
increase in the cost of bank lending.
Listed This is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is listed on a stock exchange.
Export Dummy This is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm export the products in foreign
markets.
R&D Dummy This is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm has undertaken any R&D
actvities during the last three years (2007-2009).
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Table 4: DEBT CONCENTRATION OF EUROPEAN FIRMS
The dependent variable is the HHI index. Since the HHI index is a fraction and varies between 0 and 1, the estimated model is a fractional
regression.
a b c d e f
Young (< 6 years) 0.0124 0.0113 0.0137* 0.0134* 0.0125 0.0113
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
6-20 years 0.0347** 0.0317** 0.0365** 0.0367** 0.0350** 0.0276*
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Medium firm (20-49 Employees) -0.0428*** -0.0439*** -0.0432*** -0.0428*** -0.0384*** -0.0379***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Large firm (50-249 Employees) -0.0782*** -0.0836*** -0.0847*** -0.0850*** -0.0752*** -0.0786***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Large firm (over 250 Employees) -0.0394** -0.0513*** -0.0532*** -0.0512** -0.0392* -0.0463**
(0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Group 0.0306*** 0.0290*** 0.0289*** 0.0318*** 0.0229**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
M&As -0.0186 -0.0161 -0.0166 -0.0138 -0.0134
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Financial constraints -0.0546*** -0.0545*** -0.0531*** -0.0372***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Increase finance cost -0.0385*** -0.0382*** -0.0375*** -0.0364***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Listed -0.0151 -0.0127 -0.0223
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Export Dummy -0.0146* -0.0169**
(0.008) (0.008)
R&D Dummy -0.0314*** -0.0307***
(0.008) (0.008)
Austria 0.0589*
(0.031)
France 0.0576***
(0.016)
Hungary 0.1269***
(0.022)
Italy 0.0281**
(0.014)
Spain -0.0377***
(0.014)
United Kingdom 0.0963***
(0.016)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
ll -3260 -3257 -3229 -3224 -3218 -3188
N 6764 6762 6724 6712 6712 6712
*p<0.10,** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Note: The base category comprises firms located in Germany, which have a small size (between 10-19 employees), and have more than 20 years
old.
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Table 5: HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL FOR HHI
The model consists of two equations. The first stage consists of a probit model for the probability of holding debt and relies on the entire sample
of firms. The second stage consists of a linear regression for the HHI index relying only on the sample of firms holding a positive amount of
debt.
First stage Second Stage
Prob. to hold debt HHI index
Young (< 6 years) 0.0134* 0.0075
(0.007) (0.008)
6-20 years 0.0252* 0.0194
(0.013) (0.014)
Medium firm (20-49 Employees) 0.0302*** -0.0397***
(0.008) (0.008)
Large firm (50-249 Employees) 0.0661*** -0.0852***
(0.010) (0.011)
Large firm (over 250 Employees) 0.0378** -0.0523***
(0.015) (0.017)
Group -0.0462*** 0.0303***
(0.008) (0.010)
M&As 0.0443*** -0.0116
(0.012) (0.011)
Financial constraints 0.5109*** -0.0452***
(0.016) (0.016)
Increase finance cost 0.6404*** -0.0437***
(0.005) (0.007)
Listed 0.0117 -0.0142*
(0.007) (0.008)
Export Dummy 0.0294*** -0.0291***
(0.007) (0.007)
R&D Dummy -0.0764*** 0.0036
(0.020) (0.031)
Austria 0.0243 0.0265
(0.017) (0.028)
France 0.1204*** 0.0573***
(0.009) (0.014)
Hungary 0.0881*** 0.1308***
(0.020) (0.022)
Italy 0.2486*** 0.0237*
(0.010) (0.013)
Spain 0.2748*** -0.0329**
(0.011) (0.013)
United Kingdom 0.1154*** 0.0961***
(0.011) (0.015)
Sector dummies Yes Yes
Log-likelihood -7616
Observations 14638 6712
Lr test rho=0 chi2=1.90 p=0.167
*p<0.10,** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
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Table 10: INDICATOR OF COUNTRY DEBT CONCENTRATION
Country Mean Min Max
Austria 0.738 0.710 0.771
France 0.760 0.724 0.855
Germany 0.679 0.648 0.717
Hungary 0.814 0.793 0.840
Italy 0.720 0.681 0.827
Spain 0.647 0.615 0.687
United Kingdom 0.786 0.753 0.872
The indicator is defined as the level of debt concentration measured at the country-sector level. The coefficients on the country and sector
dummies are obtained from Table (4), which relies only on those firms who hold a positive amount of debt.
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